I haven’t had much time to post during the last two months, because my university asked me to take a leadership role on our presidential search committee. Our search, however, is connected to an upcoming event that may interest some of you: this Symposium on the University Presidency.
Ohio State’s Board of Trustees had the innovative idea of framing the university’s search by convening a panel of current and former presidents to discuss the presidential role in a modern university. If you’ll be in Columbus, Ohio, this Friday afternoon, you’re welcome to stop by. If you’ll be anywhere else in the world, you can follow the proceedings by live webcast; web information will appear soon on the page linked above.
The symposium includes Teresa Sullivan, the President of the University of Virginia who clashed famously with her university’s Board of Visitors. Scott Cowen, the Tulane University President who helped his campus survive Hurricane Katrina, will also speak–along with three other articulate and knowledgeable presidents.
This piece was published in this month’s National Jurist PreLaw Magazine.
If you’re thinking about applying to law school, you likely have two main questions. Can I get in? and Should I go? Lately, the answers have shifted for many individuals. A higher percentage of applicants are getting into law school; fewer are deciding to attend.
Getting into law school remains an achievement. It signals intelligence and determination. But before deciding to attend, you need to examine your options and aspirations carefully. Don’t choose law school just because you just because you got in, you like to argue, you’ve always wanted to help people or you don’t know what else to do. Think more specifically about what you hope to achieve with a law degree.
You can find that clarity through more than your imagination. Law school is a professional school, so go see what the professionals do. Shadow a variety of lawyers, meet dozens more and do anything you can to peer into the career paths of those who came before you.
Once you’ve developed some ideas about the type of career you want, check out employment outcomes for specific schools. The American Bar Association has a website with recent employment information for every accredited law school. Nationwide, only 56 percent of 2012 law graduates found full-time, long-term jobs requiring bar admission within nine months of graduation. But employment rates and job patterns vary across schools, so look carefully.
Geography matters. In recent years, about two-thirds of employed law graduates obtained their first job in the state in which their school was located. Think not just about where you want to attend school, but where you want to build a career. My nonprofit organization, Law School Transparency, developed a tool that will help you find the schools that send graduates to the cities or states where you want to work, www.LSTScoreReports.com. Employment data from the ABA and other sources are available on LST school profiles too.
Understand your student loans. The federal government originates almost all law school loans these days. Research how these loans work, such as what amount you’ll have to pay and when you will have to begin repayment. Also look at the tax implications. Boston University and Georgetown law schools have developed user-friendly calculators to help you compute debt loads and repayment plans. Consider what life will be like with debt, from the impact it may have on your career choices to your family planning or psychological well-being.
Finally, ignore all U.S. News & World Report law school rankings. At best, these rankings proxy various traits — all of which are better measured through analyzing raw data on LST, the ABA, or in the ABA-LSAC Official Guide.
Even with all of the sources listed above, it’s hard to make good decisions about investing in law school. When you look at salary statistics or other information on a law school website, how can you be sure they’ve presented the data fairly?
Law School Transparency recently announced a law school certification program that builds on the resources provided by the ABA and individual schools. The program centers on assuring fair representations about financial education and job statistics. We’ll certify the inaugural group of law schools in the coming months. Certified law schools will partner with LST to help students make educated decisions about whether and where to begin their legal career.
As participants, these schools will use our certification mark to signal their compliance with best practices for publishing vital employment and financial information. “LST Certified” will also demonstrate the school’s commitment to enrolling an informed student body.
Two primary goals inspire our program. First, we want you to have access to the information you need to critically evaluate your life-changing decision. The ABA’s law school accreditation standards require some important information, but not all that you want to know. The new LST Best Practices fill the gaps.
Second, we want students like you to trust the law schools that deserve your trust. Prospective students typically struggle to distinguish between schools that claim a comprehensive picture of job outcomes and costs, and those schools that actually provide one. These days, all law schools put their best foot forward to convey their value and distinctive offerings. But fierce competition drives questionable marketing tactics.
Law school is a huge investment that requires you to balance complicated costs, potential job and educational outcomes, and intangible benefits. ABA data, law school websites, the LST website, and LST’s new certification can all help you make the best decision. None of these sources can tell you whether to attend law school — or which school to attend — but they will aid your decision-making.
Brian Sheppard of Seton Hall Law School has raised an interesting point about any financial premium associated with the JD: How much of that premium rests on the legal profession’s restrictions to entry? At the end of his post, Sheppard suggests that an “empirical study of the effects of various protectionist measures would be a worthwhile” endeavor.
I know about one such analysis, conducted by Mario Pagliero. Pagliero, an economics professor at the University of Turin, explored the relationship between bar exam difficulty and entry-level salaries for U.S. lawyers. Pagliero’s study relies on the circumstance that most of our states administer a common set of bar questions (the Multistate Bar Exam or MBE), while establishing very different passing scores. States have also changed their passing scores over the last few decades, offering a robust dataset of passing scores that vary by state and time.
Pagliero compares these passing scores with entry-level salaries reported by NALP for corresponding states and times. In this way, he explores whether exam difficulty (as measured by passing score) bears any relationship to entry-level salary.
In an initial paper, Pagliero reports a clear relationship between the two: more difficult bar exams correlate with higher entry-level salaries. He also finds that lower pass-rates correspond with higher salaries, suggesting that the first correlation relates to supply rather than quality. More difficult bar exams, in other words, reduce the supply of lawyers. Reduced supply, in turn, raises entry-level salaries. By Pagliero’s calculation, a 1% increase in bar exam difficulty corresponds with a 1.7% increase in starting salaries.
In a second paper, Pagliero uses the same data to examine a frequently debated policy question: Do licensing standards help consumers by reducing information asymmetries (in other words, by providing information about quality that consumers cannot readily obtain on their own)? Or do the standards primarily serve the profession, by restricting entry and raising salaries? Based on the data and his modeling, Pagliero concludes that, for the U.S. legal profession, “licensing, as implemented, increases salaries and decreases the availability of lawyers, thus significantly reducing consumer welfare.” (p. 481)
This isn’t terribly surprising. The legal profession enjoys significant barriers to entry: applicants must master (and pay for) four years of college, three years of law school, and the bar exam. Increasingly, they must also devote time to low-paid or volunteer apprenticeships. These substantial barriers reduce competition, allowing lawyers to charge a premium for their services.
How can this premium persist in the face of under- and unemployed lawyers? It is difficult for many of those lawyers to compete against established firms. Ethics rules prohibit lawyers from using outside investments to build a practice; lawyers may take loans, but may not share profits with nonlawyers. New lawyers also lack access to adequate supervision unless they obtain jobs with existing firms. Law graduates who fail to obtain jobs at prevailing wages may seek work in other fields rather than attempting to undercut fees.
If at least some lawyer income stems from protectionism, that raises at least two important questions. First, is protectionism good policy? Pagliero’s model suggests that US courts protect lawyers, rather than the public, by limiting access to the profession. Based on these results, other authors have called for deregulation of the profession. As individuals struggle to obtain affordable legal services, and courts flounder in a growing sea of pro se litigants, calls to deregulate the profession will continue.
Second, even without formal deregulation, the work reserved exclusively for licensed lawyers is shrinking. Companies like Legalzoom and RocketLawyer, which provide low-cost legal documents to individuals and small businesses, are flourishing. Software like WillMaker is even cheaper. My husband and I produced a full set of wills, powers of attorney, and living wills for less than $25.
These services cannibalize the work available to lawyers serving individuals and small businesses. Corporate firms, meanwhile, are losing business to in-house compliance officers, HR officials, and others who administer complex regulations for their companies. Within BigLaw, US-licensed lawyers have lost jobs to software and overseas attorneys.
The biggest threat to lawyers’ historic livelihood comes, not from technology or globalization alone, but from the way in which those forces encroach upon work that once belonged exclusively to lawyers. Lawyers, like other workers, are seeing some of their jobs lost to computers or overseas workers. For us, however, the loss may be greater than for those in unregulated fields. To the extent our incomes depended partly on a protectionism premium, we may lose a significant part of that premium as consumers find ways to address legal needs without direct representation by lawyers.
By a narrow vote of 10-9, the ABA’s Legal Education Council has approved a proposal to move back the reporting date for new-graduate employment–from nine months after graduation to ten months after earning a degree. Kyle and I have each written about this proposal, and we each submitted comments opposing the change. The decision, I think, tells prospective students and the public two things.
First, the date change loudly signals that the entry-level job market remains very difficult for recent graduates, and that law schools anticipate those challenges continuing for the foreseeable future. This was the rationale for the proposal, that large firms are hiring “far fewer entry level graduates,” that “there is a distinct tendency of judges” to seek experienced clerks, and that other employers are reluctant to hire graduates until they have been admitted to the bar.
The schools saw these forces as ones that were unfairly, and perhaps unevenly, affecting their employment rates; they wanted to make clear that their educational programs were as sound as ever. From a prospective student’s viewpoint, however, the source of job-market changes doesn’t matter. An expensive degree that leads to heavy debt, ten months of unemployment, and the need to purchase still more tutoring for the bar, is not an attractive degree. Students know that the long-term pay-off, in job satisfaction or compensation, may be high for some graduates. But this is an uncertain time in both the general economy and the regulation of law practice; early-career prospects matter to prospective students with choices.
Second, and more disappointing to me, the Council’s vote suggests a concern with the comparative status of law schools, rather than with the very real changes occurring in the profession. The ABA’s Task Force on the Future of Legal Education has just issued a working paper that calls upon law faculty to “reduce the role given to status as a measure of personal and institutional success.” That’s a hard goal to reach without leadership from the top.
Given widespread acknowledgement that the proposal to shift the reporting date stemmed from changes in the US News methodology, we aren’t getting that leadership. Nor are we getting leadership on giving students the information they need, when they need it. This is another black eye for legal education.
Law School Transparency (LST) made news last week when several blogs reported that the organization had designed a certification program for law schools. For an annual fee, LST is offering to vet a school’s website and marketing materials for consistency with ABA standards and other best practices; create user-friendly graphics that would inform potential applicants; and certify the school’s transparency to those applicants. The proposal evoked charges that LST was operating a Mafia-like protection scheme, and even violating the Hobbs Act.
Really? Let’s revisit the history behind LST’s proposal.
ABA Requirements
In August 2012, the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar adopted new standards governing law school disclosure of employment outcomes and scholarship retention rates. The Section explained these requirements in a memo distributed to all schools, and directed schools to comply with the mandates by October 5, 2012. Schools already possessed the information required by the new standard; they needed only to publish the data. To make that task as easy as possible, the ABA gave schools two simple templates for displaying data.
In late December of 2012 and early January of 2013, LST’s executive director (Kyle McEntee) and research director (Derek Tokaz) checked compliance with these requirements and issued a report. Despite the ABA’s clear mandate–and the ease of complying with those requirements–LST found that only one-third of accredited law schools had complied. Three months after the mandate took effect, 65.3% of schools had failed to publish at least one of the required tables. One in five schools (20.6%) had not published either chart.
The required charts were not mindless boilerplate. The ABA designed them to offer prospective students (1) key information about the percentage of students retaining conditional scholarships, and (2) basic employment outcomes for recent graduates. The information was essential to balance claims schools were making about scholarships and employment outcomes. Despite widespread recognition of the need for increased transparency, two-thirds of law schools failed to meet the ABA’s minimum standards.
After gathering this disheartening information, McEntee sent customized information to the dean, career services office, and admissions office of each accredited school. Those memos indicated whether the school had posted the ABA-required charts, whether other potentially misleading information appeared on the school’s site, and whether the school “went above and beyond the minimum regulatory standards” by publishing additional accurate, useful data for prospective students. After receiving this information, individuals from 102 different law schools communicated with McEntee, requesting more information about their school’s compliance or counseling on how to improve transparency. [You can find all of these details in the LST report cited above.]
After LST’s feedback, the percentage of schools complying with the ABA requirement doubled. Ninety percent (90.5%) of schools published at least one of the charts required by the ABA, while two-thirds (65.3%) provided both. Numerous schools improved other aspects of their communications with potential students, adopting some or all of the best practices suggested by LST.
In sum:
1. Despite frequent protestations of their improved transparency in communicating with potential applicants, two-thirds of accredited law schools had not complied with the ABA’s minimal disclosure requirements by early January of 2013.
2. Intervention by LST substantially improved compliance.
3. Even after that intervention, one-third of schools still failed to provide basic, required consumer information to law students.
How Do We Secure More Compliance?
As a legal educator, I find that lack of compliance astounding. How could so many law schools fail to comply with the ABA’s minimum transparency standards? These issues aren’t new. The press began spotlighting disclosure gaps in spring 2011, more than a year before the ABA issued its simple requirements. Law deans had vowed adherence to a new era of transparency, suggesting quick compliance with the new standards.
Some schools matched deeds to these words, but a majority did not. The foot dragging hurts the reputation of all law schools, but it hurts compliant schools more than the careless ones. We can’t regain the public’s trust, or recruit students to our programs, if we don’t adhere to our own accreditation standards governing transparency. Rules and lip service aren’t enough; we need compliance.
Who is going to take responsibility for achieving compliance? Do we as faculty have to police law school websites, sending polite notes to deans, admissions directors, and career services directors about omissions? If our own schools are in compliance, will we hound colleagues and deans at other schools about their failures? As scholars, we care about data integrity; as legal educators, we care about the reputation of our community. But how much time are we going to spend vetting the communications of 200 law schools?
LST proposed a solution: It would check transparency on law school websites, assuring consistency with ABA requirements as well as best practices in presenting data. Schools that followed those practices would receive a certification signaling their compliance with LST standards, which would be clearly identified to schools and the public. LST would charge for its time doing this work. That’s not a surprise: Most of us charge for our time when we work. The only surprise was that LST performed this work for free over the last few years.
This solution also addressed a request that LST had received from several deans. After receiving a high rating on LST’s transparency index, some deans asked if LST would give them a letter attesting to their transparency. Others blogged, tweeted, or posted about their success (see footnote 23 of this review). Schools clearly wanted to demonstrate their commitment to transparency, a desire that LST could fulfill–as long as someone was willing to pay for their time.
LST’s certification program is designed to fill the above needs. The price, $1,925 for the first year, would cover modest salaries for the individuals doing this work. For a price comparison, consider that the ABA is paying $75,000 for an advisory firm simply to design a protocol for reviewing the integrity of data generated by law schools (a somewhat different need than the one LST proposes addressing). That $75,000 fee won’t cover any actual reviews; it will support only design of a protocol. LST has already created its protocol–for free. With $75,000, it could apply the protocol to assure that thirty-nine different law schools are providing accurate, transparent data to prospective students.
What Now?
Will LST’s certification program go forward? Fortified by a few negative blog posts, law deans may decide to forego certification and the best practices it requires. If they do, I hope that faculty at their schools will be willing to pick up the slack. Slipshod practices in reporting data are embarrassing to all of us. For years, I shook my head at the way schools reported salary information without noting response rates. We wouldn’t tolerate those practices in scholarly papers; they’re even less appropriate when urging potential students to attend our schools.
I hope some deans will embrace LST’s certification process. It’s a good way to move forward, demonstrate a real commitment to transparency, and give prospective students the information they need.
Personal Disclosure
LST doesn’t have investors; it’s a nonprofit without shares to sell. It does, however, have some donors and I am one. I gave the organization $500 in 2012 and $5,000 earlier this year; the latter is a bit less than the amount I have been giving each year to the law school where I teach (with that money going to summer fellowships for students). In addition to my financial gifts, I have served as an unpaid adviser to LST.
What do I get for my donations and free advice to LST? No football tickets, mugs, stickers, or expectations of profit. All I “get” is the satisfaction that potential law students will receive the information they need to make good decisions about their careers–and that law schools themselves, encouraged by LST, will volunteer that information more freely.
LST never solicited me for my donations. I was impressed with their work and offered the support I could afford. I am paid well for the work I do, and I think LST deserves to be paid for their work. They have done much to create needed transparency at law schools and to serve prospective law students. I wish other law professors would support LST, even at much lower levels than I have provided. With more donations, LST would not need to charge for the transparency work that it does.
I was sufficiently impressed with Kyle McEntee that I invited him to moderate this blog with me. I don’t agree with everything he writes (and he doesn’t agree with everything I write), but I thought it was important to include a recent graduate’s perspective in a blog about legal education. There are blogs written by professors, and blogs written by recent graduates, but I believe we are one of the few sites trying to combine those perspectives.
And, yes, this blog is “as purely non-profit as the driven snow.” It’s not just non-profit; it’s non-income. No advertising, no trinkets for sale, just ideas to discuss.
I haven’t been surprised by the extensive discussion of the recent paper by Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre. The paper deserves attention from many readers. I have been surprised, however, by the number of scholars who endorse the paper–and even scorn skeptics–while acknowledging that they don’t understand the methods underlying Simkovic and McIntyre’s results. An empirical paper is only as good as its method; it’s essential for scholars to engage with that method.
I’ll discuss one methodological issue here: the small sample sizes underlying some of Simkovic and McIntyre’s results. Those sample sizes undercut the strength of some claims that Simkovic and McIntyre make in the current draft of the paper.
What Is the Sample in Simkovic & McIntyre?
Simkovic and McIntyre draw their data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a very large survey of U.S. households. The authors, however, don’t use all of the data in the survey; they focus on (a) college graduates whose highest degree is the BA, and (b) JD graduates. SIPP provides a large sample of the former group: Each of the four panels yielded information on 6,238 to 9,359 college graduates, for a total of 31,556 BAs in the sample. (I obtained these numbers, as well as the ones for JD graduates, from Frank McIntyre. He and Mike Simkovic have been very gracious in answering my questions.)
The sample of JD graduates, however, is much smaller. Those totals range from 282 to 409 for the four panels, yielding a total of 1,342 law school graduates. That’s still a substantial sample size, but Simkovic and McIntyre need to examine subsets of the sample to support their analyses. To chart changes in the financial premium generated by a law degree, for example, they need to examine reported incomes for each of the sixteen years in the sample. Those small groupings generate the uncertainty I discuss here.
Confidence Intervals
Statisticians deal with small sample sizes by generating confidence intervals. The confidence interval, sometimes referred to as a “margin of error,” does two things. First, it reminds us that numbers plucked from samples are just estimates; they are not precise reflections of the underlying population. If we collect income data from 1,342 law school graduates, as SIPP did, we can then calculate the means, medians, and other statistics about those incomes. The median income for the 1,342 JDs in the Simkovic & McIntyre study, for example, was $82,400 in 2012 dollars. That doesn’t mean that the median income for all JDs was exactly $82,400; the sample offers an estimate.
Second, the confidence interval gives us a range in which the true number (the one for the underlying population) is likely to fall. The confidence interval for JD income, for example, might be plus-or-minus $5,000. If that were the confidence interval for the median given above, then we could be relatively sure that the true median lay somewhere between $77,400 and $87,400. ($5,000 is a ballpark estimate of the confidence interval, used here for illustrative purposes; it is not the precise interval.)
Small samples generate large confidence intervals, while larger samples produce smaller ones. That makes intuitive sense: the larger our sample, the more precisely it will reflect patterns in the underlying population. We have to exercise particular caution when interpreting small samples, because they are more likely to offer a distorted view of the population we’re trying to understand. Confidence intervals make sure we exercise that caution.
Our brains, unfortunately, are not wired for confidence intervals. When someone reports the estimate from a sample, we tend to focus on that particular reported number–while ignoring the confidence interval. Considering the confidence interval, however, is essential. If a political poll reports that Dewey is leading Truman, 51% to 49%, with a 3% margin of error, then the race is too close to call. Based on this poll, actual support for Dewey could be as low as 48% (3 points lower than the reported value) or as high as 54% (3 points higher than the reported value). Dewey might win decisively, the result might be a squeaker, or Truman might win.
Is the Earnings Premium Cyclical?
Now let’s look at Figure 5 in the Simkovic and McIntyre paper. This figure shows the earnings premium for a JD compared to a BA over a range of 16 years. The shape of the solid line is somewhat cyclical, leading to the Simkovic/McIntyre suggestion that “[t]he law degree earnings premium is cyclical,” together with their observation that recent changes in income levels are due to “ordinary cyclicality.” (pp. 49, 32)
But what lies behind that somewhat cyclical solid line in Figure 5? The line ties together sixteen points, each of which represents the estimated premium for a single year. Each point draws upon the incomes of a few hundred graduates, a relatively small group. Those small sample sizes produce relatively large confidence intervals around each estimate. Simkovic & McIntyre show those confidence intervals with dotted lines above and below the solid line. The estimated premium for 1996, for example, is about .54, but the confidence interval stretches from about .42 to about .66. We can be quite confident that JD graduates, on average, enjoyed a financial premium over BAs in 1996, but we’re much less certain about the size of the premium. The coefficient for this premium could be as low as .42 or as high as .66.
So what? As long as the premiums were positive, how much do we care about their size? Remember that Simkovic and McIntyre suggest that the earnings premium is cyclical. They rely on that cyclicality, in turn, to suggest that any recent downturns in earnings are part of an ordinary cycle.
The results reported in Figure 5, however, cannot confirm cyclicality. The specific estimates look cyclical, but the confidence intervals urge caution. Figure 5 shows those intervals as lines that parallel the estimated values, but the confidence intervals belong to each point–not to the line as a whole. The real premium for each year most likely falls somewhere within the confidence interval for each year, but we can’t say where.
Simkovic and McIntyre could supplement their analysis by testing the relationship among these estimates; it’s possible that, statistically, they could reject the hypothesis that the earnings premium was stable. They might even be able to establish cyclicality with more certainty. We can’t reach those conclusions from Figure 5 and the currently reported analyses, however; the confidence intervals are too wide for certain interpretation. All of the internet discussion of the cyclicality of the earnings premium has been premature.
Recent Graduates
Similar problems affect Simkovic and McIntyre’s statements about recent graduates. In Figure 6, they depict the earnings premium for law school graduates aged 25-29 in four different time periods. The gray bars show the estimated premium for each time period, with the vertical lines indicating the confidence interval. Notice how long those confidence intervals are: The interval for 1996-1999 stretches from about 0.04 through about 0.54. The other periods show similarly extended intervals.
Those large confidence intervals reflect very small sample sizes. The 1996 panel offered income information on just sixteen JD graduates aged 25-29; the 2001 panel included twenty-five of those graduates; the 2004 panel, seventeen; and the 2008 panel twenty-six graduates. With such small samples, we have very little confidence (in both the every day and statistical senses) that the premium estimates are correct.
It seems likely that the premium was positive throughout this period–although the very small sample sizes and possible bimodality of incomes could undermine even that conclusion. We can’t, however, say much more than that. If we take confidence intervals into account, the premium might have declined steadily throughout this period, from about 0.54 in the earliest period to 0.33 in the most recent one. Or it might have risen, from a very modest 0.05 in the first period to a robust 0.80 more recently. Again, we just don’t know.
It would be useful for Simkovic and McIntyre to acknowledge the small number of recent law school graduates in their sample; that would help ground readers in the data. When writing a paper like this, especially for an interdisciplinary audience, it’s difficult to anticipate what kind of information the audience may need. I’m surprised that so many legal scholars enthusiastically endorsed these results without noting the large confidence intervals.
Onward
There has been much talk during the last two weeks about Kardashians, charlatans, and even the Mafia. I’m not sure any legal academic leads quite that exciting a life; I know I don’t. As a professor who has taught Law and Social Science, I think the critics of the Simkovic/McIntyre paper raised many good questions. Empirical analyses need testing, and it is especially important to examine the assumptions that lie behind a quantitative study.
The questions weren’t all good. Nor, I’m afraid, were all of the questions I’ve heard about other papers over the years. That’s the nature of academic debate and refining hypotheses: sometimes we have to ask questions just to figure out what we don’t know.
Endorsements of the paper, similarly, spanned a spectrum. Some were thoughtful, others seemed reflexive. I was disappointed at how few of the paper’s supporters engaged fully in the paper’s method, asking questions like the ones I have raised about sample size and confidence intervals.
I hope to write a bit more on the Simkovic and McIntyre paper; there are more questions to raise about their conclusions. I may also try to offer some summaries of other research that has been done on the career paths of law school graduates and lawyers. We don’t have nearly enough research in the field, but there are some other studies worth knowing.
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Deborah J. Merritt
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Kyle McEntee
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